Abstract
This dissertation consists of four papers that contribute to literatures on human rights, domestic political institutions, and international cooperation. Specifically, I look at how domestic and international political institutions affect commitment to international human rights law and domestic respect for human rights. In Chapter 2, I argue that the domestic incentives dictators face to support the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and engage in human rights violations are moderated in countries with effective domestic judiciaries. Chapter 3 takes advantage of variation in the number of democracies that have signed and ratified the Optional Protocol to the CAT and tests hypotheses about the conditions under which new democracies support human rights. Because different actors are responsible for signing, ratification, and compliance, legislatures in new democracies should be less likely to ratify, and bureaucracies and militaries should be less likely to comply with, these treaties when members of a former dictatorship participate in the new democratic government. In Chapter 4, I argue that petitions presented to international courts and like-organizations can be used to name and shame states that violate human rights. Such shaming only leads to improvements in human rights, however, when international audiences---specifically, foreign aid donors---have standing to pressure for domestic reform. Chapter 5 argues that domestic political institutions (in conjunction with environmental constraints) influence executive actions regarding state concessions. Although dictators "buy off" some types of domestic opposition with material concessions and liberalize when they face other types of opposition, financial conditions can sometimes limit a dictator's ability to respond beneficently to the opposition.
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