Type of Document Dissertation Author Scheller, Daniel Staton URN etd-08122010-122319 Title The Political Economy of Neighborhood Governance Degree Doctor of Philosophy Department Political Science, Department of Advisory Committee
Advisor Name Title Charles Barrilleaux Committee Chair Carol Weissert Committee Member Richard Feiock Committee Member Robert Jackson Committee Member David Cooper University Representative Keywords
- Experimental Economics
- Property Values
- Homeowner Associations
- Neighborhood Associations
Date of Defense 2010-06-01 Availability unrestricted AbstractIn the first paper of the dissertation, I ask, "How do residential community associations (RCAs) vary in the type of neighborhood issues/problems they devote time to solving?" Are some issues more important in neighborhood development, and do neighborhood and homeowner associations differ in the major issues they routinely address? There is likely to be a large degree of variation among these organizations in terms of their goals for the neighborhood. A neighborhood organization operating in a poor neighborhood certainly has different goals and problems compared to a wealthier neighborhood organization in an upscale neighborhood. The neighborhood organization representing the poor neighborhood may not be able to focus actions on loftier goals like improving property values due to other issues like crime. An upscale neighborhood likely does not face such problems and its organization can direct activities toward property-value-improving activities. I argue that neighborhoods must address issues in a policy hierarchy - certain issues like crime and blight cleanup must be addressed before a neighborhood organization can engage in other activities like lobbying local government for better services and enforcing restrictive covenants to improve property values. I use survey methods and the elite interviewing of neighborhood and homeowner association presidents in Leon County, Florida to answer the above questions. I first focus on whether or not the two types of organizations differ in having the enhancement of property values as a main goal. I then attempt to create a hierarchy of needs that neighborhood governments must address in a typical orderly pattern. This neighborhood hierarchy of needs is analogous to Abraham Maslow's (1968) social psychological hierarchy of needs for humans, but in this case, applied to the life cycle of neighborhood organizations.
In the second paper of the dissertation, I address questions concerning neighborhood organization and cooperation. Are residents of certain neighborhoods more likely to contribute money to the provision of a public good compared to citizens in other types of neighborhoods? For example, are citizens that live within the jurisdiction of a homeowner association more or less likely to cooperate with neighbors when asked to donate to the provision of a public good? If they are more or less likely to donate to the provision of a public good, can this willingness be attributed to participation and attendance at homeowner association meetings? I am interested in how practicing elements of democracy at the neighborhood-level affects an individual's willingness to donate funds to the provision of a neighborhood public good. I use a laboratory setting where subjects participate in a mock neighborhood association/government session and then have them play iterated public goods games in an attempt to determine if participatory democracy compels individuals to donate to the provision of a public good.
In the final paper of the dissertation, I build off of previous findings in extant research and in the dissertation by studying the effects of neighborhood organization on house prices. Specifically, I determine if neighborhood governments, in the form of neighborhood and homeowner associations have any effect on property values. I then examine how these two types of governments may uniquely affect property values, and I find that homeowner associations have a significant positive impact on property values, while neighborhood associations have no effect.
Filename Size Approximate Download Time (Hours:Minutes:Seconds)
28.8 Modem 56K Modem ISDN (64 Kb) ISDN (128 Kb) Higher-speed Access Scheller_D_Dissertation_2010.pdf 1.09 Mb 00:05:01 00:02:35 00:02:15 00:01:07 00:00:05