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Type of Document Dissertation Author Sherrill, Clifton W. URN etd-11072003-161605 Title Deterrence and Clarity: U.S. Security Policy in the Asian-Pacific, 1950-1970 Degree Doctor of Philosophy Department Political Science, Department of Advisory Committee
Advisor Name Title Dale L. Smith Committee Chair James P. Jones Committee Member Paul R. Hensel Committee Member Thomas M. Carsey Committee Member William R. Van Cleave Committee Member Keywords
- declaratory policy
- contextual deterrence
Date of Defense 2003-10-22 Availability unrestricted Abstract DETERRENCE AND CLARITY: U.S. SECURITYPOLICY IN THE ASIAN-PACIFIC, 1950-1970
Name: Clifton W. Sherrill
Department: Political Science
Major Professor: Dale L. Smith
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Term Degree Awarded: Fall, 2003
Rational deterrence theory understates the importance of declaratory policy by dismissing such as rhetoric. The theory presented here asserts that declaratory policy can provide significant information to a challenger regarding a defender’s resolve. In keeping with the traditional deterrence literature, the success of deterrence is described as a function of the credibility of the deterrent threat; however, a somewhat different formulation of credibility is proposed. Credibility is explained as a combination of the balance of capabilities and the balance of interests between the challenger and defender, conditioned by the contextual risk propensity of each. Risk propensity is most important when information on the balance of capabilities and interests is either unavailable or reveals relative equality between challenger and defender. By looking to the declaratory policy of a defender, this uncertainty can be reduced. Including rather than ignoring the impact of declaratory policy provides a more accurate understanding of deterrence with important prescriptive implications for policy-makers. To assess risk propensity, a psychologically based approach is used rather than the expected utility approach more common to political science models. Based on a framework of psychological biases offered by Jervis (1976) and prospect theory as developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1982; 1984; 1992), a contextual, individually based determination of risk propensity is created. The theory is tested using a series of nine crises in the Asian Pacific from 1950 through 1970 in which the United States attempted to deter behavior by different autocratic states. Each crisis is discussed in depth with assessments provided of the significant factors suggested by the theory. The final chapter analyzes these assessments to determine whether there is empirical
support for the theory. By moving away from assumptions endemic to rational choice and toward a conscious inclusion of psychological factors, a more accurate descriptive theory of practical deterrence is provided.
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