Abstract
The objective of this thesis is twofold. I first wish to address all four of the major theories revolving around the motives for the intervention into Russia, as no other work has done so. The first theory is that the war in Europe spurred the Allies to intervene in Russia- to keep Russian resources out of German hands. The saving of the Czechoslovak Legion from the Bolsheviks is a second theory. The fear of Bolshevism and the wish to strangle it in the cradle, as Churchill put it, is a third theory. The fourth and last theory is that the impetus for intervention came from a fear that a unilateral intervention by Japan in Siberia would lead to Japanese conquest- and the United States was unwilling to see this occur. I will also test the validity of these four theories against the primary sources, and this is also a novel aspect among intervention literature. The facts indicate that the Czechoslovak Legion was not a major cause for the Allies. Stopping Germany and, for the U.S., stopping Japan, seem to be the strongest motivations for the intervention. Bolshevism was an influence on the Allies, but not strong enough an influence to cause the intervention on its own.
The second objective of this thesis is to ask a number of questions about the actions of President Woodrow Wilson during the intervention. Again, these questions are unique, no other work on the intervention asks them (the exception is Foglesong’s work, which asks some of these questions, but gives no answers and no evidence on which to build answers). There is some speculation that the intervention in Russia was similar to another action in Mexico (1914), which was headed by Wilson. Were these interventions run on similar lines? Yes, but there were minor differences in the interventions. The indication is that the Russian action was directed, its policy created, by Wilson alone. What was Wilson’s role? Based on the above, the Aide Mémoire, and other information, Wilson was the leader of the intervention. Finally, if the intervention was run by Wilson, why that Wilson was not opposed to the intervention, but wanted to wait for the right time to use U.S. troops.
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