Abstract
This thesis examines and analyzes Russian and Austro-Hungarian foreign policy and the rivalry between them between 1904-1914. It asserts the centrality of prestige-garnering as a motivator of their Balkan diplomacy, not only to project an image of strength to their European rivals, but to distract from each’s volatile and parlous domestic situation. Both Russia and Austria-Hungary pursued a Balkan policy that emphasized form over substance in order to convince their subjects and rivals that their integrities were intact and unassailable. Instead of more tangible foreign policy goals like territory or economics, abstract notions of imperial dignity, honor, and Great Power status, ideas that became the primary reason for the Great War’s outbreak, fueled the rivalry between the two eastern monarchies.
The scope of this study is a departure from other accounts of European Great Power diplomacy because it concentrates on the decade before the war instead of a lengthy narrative since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. In addition, instead of bringing into the discussion the entirety of the European Congress, this thesis focuses on the struggle between the Romanov and Habsburg states to be recognized as the mistress of southeastern Europe. By focusing on the prestige rivalry between St. Petersburg and Vienna, this study shifts the focus from the Anglo-Germany naval rivalry in the North Sea to the wrangling over the Balkan Peninsula, the region in which the war’s first shots were fired. As a result, it challenges the notion that Germany is most responsible for the chaos, asserting instead that Austria-Hungary is the most to blame.
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