

CHAPTER 5

BOOLEAN ANALYSIS OF CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION ATTEMPTS IN FIVE CITIES

The last chapter provided a brief overview of each city's consolidation attempts. In order to compare and contrast these complex cases, a Boolean analysis was performed. A discussion of those analyses is provided in this chapter. In each case, attributes specified in the model were coded as present if references to them were in published accounts.

5.01 Boolean Analysis of Procedural Safeguards

There were twelve consolidation attempts for five cities in 30 years. Two were successful and ten were unsuccessful. With regard to procedural safeguards, there are interesting combinations that lead to acceptance or rejection of the proposed consolidation charter. Since comprehensive consolidation provides a new local constitution, the combination of rules can be new to the entire electorate. This may be why there are different groups who support or oppose the proposed constitution.

The configurations for rejection or acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter can be complex, since each charter can have a myriad of new and different rules. If we use just Maser's procedural safeguards, the model is:

OUTCOME = DISTRICT + NUMBER + SEATS + INITIATIVE + REFERENDUM + RECALL
+ TAX_RATES + DEBT_LIMITS + FOG + MAYOR + VETO

where: DISTRICT = presence of the procedural safeguard in the number of district representatives
NUMBER = presence of the procedural safeguard in number of districts
SEATS = presence of the procedural safeguard in number of seats
INITIATIVE = presence of the procedural safeguard in initiative
REFERENDUM = presence of the procedural safeguard in referendum petition
RECALL = presence of the procedural safeguard in recall
TAX_RATES = presence of the procedural safeguard for tax limits
DEBT_LIMITS = presence of the procedural safeguard for debt limits
FOG = presence of the procedural safeguard in form of government (presence is mayor/council)
MAYOR = presence of the procedural safeguard in direct election of Mayor
VETO = presence of the procedural safeguard in mayor veto

The full Truth Table is presented in Appendix A, Table A 5.01. There were no contradictory configurations in the model. Contradictory configurations occur when one configuration produces both an acceptance and a rejection. The ten instances of rejection of the proposed consolidation charter provide ten different configurations.

In the two configurations for acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter, factoring can highlight the common elements:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ACCEPTANCE} = & \\ & \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*MAYOR *VETO} \\ & [\text{seats*initiative*referendum*recall*tax_rates*DEBT_LIMITS*fog} + \\ & \text{SEATS*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*TAX_RATES*debt_limits*FOG}] \end{aligned}$$

The presence of four procedural safeguards rules in the configuration was important to the outcome: the same or increase in the number of district representatives AND the same or increase in number of districts AND the direct election of mayor AND the provision of the mayoral veto.

When these configurations are run with the “don’t cares,” the logical configurations for rejection or acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter is presented in Table 5.01.

Table 5.01 Consolidation Rules with “Don’t Cares”

reject	number + seats*FOG
ACCEPT	- one of the following - tax_rates*fog + referendum*fog + NUMBER*fog + DEBT_LIMITS*fog + fog*MAYOR + fog*VETO + - one of the following - NUMBER*SEATS + NUMBER*RECALL*TAX_RATES*debt_limits + DISTRICT* NUMBER*RECALL*TAX_RATES

PRESENCE in upper case; absence lower case; * = AND; + = OR

The rejection model is parsimonious. Rejection of the proposed consolidation charter could occur when the proposed rules contain absence of the procedural safeguard for the number of districts OR the rule would decrease the number of seats AND the provide the mayor-council form of government. The absence of the procedural safeguard for the provision of the same or an increase in the number of representation districts is logically sufficient for rejection of the proposed consolidation charter. However, the proposed consolidation charter could also be rejected if it does not contain the procedural safeguard of the same or greater number of representation seats AND yet does provide the procedural safeguard of the mayor-council form of government.

Attributes of the configurations for the acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter, logically, are the more complex. There are nine possible configurations that can be linked to the acceptance of a proposed consolidation charter. However, there are only two configurations, one from each set that are required to produce a complete formula. The configurations in each group have the same logically importance of occurrence so only one is needed. For example, the consolidation charter could be accepted if there was the absence of both a procedural safeguard rule for referendum petition AND the absence of mayor-council form of government OR provision of the same or increase in the number of districts AND the same or increase in the number of seats. The common attributes in the first group of configurations is the change in the form of government in conjunction with other attributes either present or absent. In the second group the presence of an increase number of districts is the common factor. The provision of recall and a tax rate cap is present in two of the choices for acceptance of a consolidation charter.

The rules are important, but the electorate may take their cue for acceptance or rejection based on which groups supported or opposed the proposed change. The next section looks at which groups actively supported the proposed consolidation charter.

5.02 Boolean Analysis of Support for the Proposed Consolidation Charter

Actors who supported the proposed consolidation charter had preferences for the outcome. These supporters were noted in the newspaper articles for each city. The support model contains ten actors/groups that were noted as supporters of the effort. The League of Women

Voters and the local newspapers were present and public supporters for all the consolidation attempts. These actors were treated as constants.

The model tested for support of a consolidation is:

$$\text{ACCEPT} = \text{DEVELOPERS} + \text{CIVIC} + \text{HOMEOWNERS/TAXPAYERS} + \text{MAYOR} + \text{COUNTY} + \text{PROFESSIONALS} + \text{BLACK} + \text{BUSINESS} + \text{GOVERNMENT} + \text{NAACP}$$

where:

DEVELOPERS = active public support by the real estate, developers, and homebuilders

CIVIC = active public support by civic organizations, does not include the League of Women Voters

HOMEOWNERS = active public support by homeowner associations and/or taxpayers groups

MAYOR = active public support by the mayor

COUNTY = active public support by a majority of the county commissioners

PROFESSIONALS = active public support by professional organizations (bar association, trade unions, etc.)

BLACK = active public support by local Black leaders

BUSINESS = active public support from business leaders

GOVERNMENT = active public support from any government employees or government employee groups (unions, fraternal orders)

NAACP = active public support by National Association for the Advancement of Colored People organization and/or local NAACP leaders

In the model there were no contradictory configurations, that is when one configuration produces both an acceptance and a rejection. The full crisp set Truth Table configurations for rejection and acceptance are presented in Appendix A. Table A 5.02.

The ten community combinations of supporters in rejected consolidation charters produce eight configurations. These eight configurations have one attribute in common, the absence of public support from the local NAACP organization or its leader. However, note that in the successful acceptance of the consolidation charters that the public support of the NAACP leaders and/or organization are present. When the supporting actors configurations are run with the “don’t cares,” the logical configurations for rejection or acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter is presented in Table 5.02.

Table 5.02 Consolidation Supporters with “Don’t Cares

reject	naacp
ACCEPT	NAACP

PRESENCE in upper case; absence lower case; * = AND; + = OR

The usefulness of including the don’t care is that it provides the most logical combinations of attributes that can be linked to the outcome. The presence of vocal, active, public support from the NAACP or NAACP officials logically can be the necessary and sufficient attribute that determines acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter. Lack of support can also be linked to rejection. Since the presence or absence of public support for the consolidation effort by the NAACP organization or leaders is a logical necessary and sufficient attribute that leads to the outcome, the model was run again without the influence of the NAACP to explore which combination of actors could be linked to the outcome of the consolidation charter. These are presented in Appendix A, Table A 5.03.

The full Truth Table without the NAACP attribute mirrors the configurations in Table A 5.02, except for the elimination of the attribute of support by the NAACP. When this model was run with the “Don’t Cares,” they provided an interesting combination of supporting actors for the rejection of the consolidation charter. These are presented in Table 5.03.

Table 5.03 Consolidation Rejection Model of Supporters without the NAACP with “Don’t Cares”

reject	[1] black + [2] professionals + [3] civic*government + [4] DEVELOPERS*government + [5] DEVELOPERS*CIVIC + — One of the Following — [6] homeowners*government + [7] homeowners*county
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PRESENCE in upper case; absence lower case; * = AND; + = OR

This provides a more complex formula for rejection and acceptance. In rejection of the proposed consolidation charter, the absence of public support from Black leaders OR professional organizations can lead to rejection of the proposed consolidation charter. These can be sufficient attributes. Likewise the combination of the absence of public support by civic organizations AND the absence of public support from government employees can also lead to rejection. However, the presence of active, public support from developers, real estate, or homebuilders can logically lead to rejection when they are teamed with either the absence of active support by government employees OR the presence of active support from the civic organizations. Finally, there are two combinations that have logically equal importance of occurrence, so only one is needed to complete the formula. The absence of active support by homeowner associations AND either the absence of public support by civic organizations OR the absence of public support from government employees can also lead to rejection.

This provides some interesting implications for the electorate's perception of incentives by different groups in the campaign for consolidation. The active, public support by developers, homebuilders or real estate actors could lead the citizens to question the motives of the proposed change. When the only other active supporting actor is included, the active support by civic organizations and developers rejection could occur.

Caution should be used when interpreting the absence of active public support. Those groups that did not actively support the proposed consolidation charter are not necessarily opposed to the charter. The definition used in coding the active supporters was active, vocal, public support substantiated in the newspapers. Those actors who were absent in active, public support were not mentioned in the newspapers and therefore their activity is not known.

This provides an indication of which groups who actively supported the proposed consolidation constitution could be linked to rejection. The acceptance model of support for the proposed consolidation charter without the influence of the NAACP is presented in Table 5.04.

**Table 5.04 Consolidation Acceptance Model of Supporters
without the NAACP with “Don’t Cares”**

ACCEPT	<p>— One of the Following —</p> <p>[1] developers*HOMEOWNERS + [2] developers*PROFESSIONALS + [3] developers*CIVIC*BUSINESS + [4] developers*BLACK*BUSINESS +</p> <p>— One of the Following —</p> <p>[5] civic*GOVERNMENT + [6] COUNTY*PROFESSIONALS + [7] PROFESSIONALS*GOVERNMENT + [8] civic*mayor*COUNTY + [9] civic*homeowners*COUNTY + [10] civic*mayor*BLACK + [11] civic*homeowners*BLACK + [12] mayor*PROFESSIONALS*BLACK + [13] homeowners*PROFESSIONALS*BLACK + [14] civic*PROFESSIONALS*BLACK + [15] civic*COUNTY*BUSINESS + [16] civic*BLACK*BUSINESS</p>
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PRESENCE in upper case; absence lower case; * = AND; + = OR

Acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter has two combinations of configurations that have logically equal importance of occurrence so a final formula would contain only one from each group. For example, a complete logical formula could include: the absence of active public support by developers/real estate companies/homebuilders AND the presence of active public support by homeowner associations [ACCEPT 1] OR the absence of active public support by civic organizations AND the active public support of Black leaders AND the active support of business leaders [ACCEPT 16].

In the acceptance configurations there are some important combinations. First the developers are not active, public supporters, but remember caution should be exercised with the absence of public support. Second, in only one logical configuration [ACCEPT 3] the presence of the active public support from civic organizations is combined with the active public support by business leaders. In the choice between ACCEPT # 5 through # 16, supporters represent the minority leaders, professional or business leaders, the government employees, and a majority of

the county commissioners, in combination with other groups. This could provide a cue to the electorate of a campaign that is not considered an “elite” agenda.

The next question is: Which groups actively, publicly oppose the proposed consolidation? The opposition is explored in the next section.

5.03 Boolean Analysis of Opposition to the Proposed Consolidation Charter

Just as actors and groups support change, there are those actors and groups who oppose the proposed change, based on either benefits of the present combination of rules or on the fear that change would cause greater harm. Ten actors were used to explore opposition to the proposed consolidation charter. In some cases these could be the same categories of groups as in support of the change. However, in each city these are individuals or groups who differ from the supporters. For example, just as there was active public supporter from the Black leadership in communities, there may also be Black leaders who oppose the proposed change. In some cases, groups such as the local electric authorities or rural electric companies may not have provided any support for change.

In order to distinguish the support actors from the opposition actor, actors who publicly opposed the consolidation effort are *italicized* and underlined to differentiate them from those actors who support the consolidation effort. The model for opposition is:

$$\text{OUTCOME} = \textit{HOMEOWNERS/TAXPAYERS} + \textit{CIVIC} + \textit{FARMERS} + \textit{CITY} + \textit{MAYOR} + \textit{BUSINESS} + \textit{OTHERCHAMBER} + \textit{BLACK} + \textit{UTILITIES}$$

where:

HOMEOWNERS/TAXPAYERS = active public opposition by homeowner associations and/or taxpayers groups

CIVIC = active public opposition by civic organizations, does not include the League of Women Voters

FARMERS = active public opposition by farmers or farming groups

CITY = active public opposition by a majority of the present city council

MAYOR = active public opposition by the present city mayor

COUNTY = active public opposition by a majority of the present county commission

BUSINESS = active public opposition by local business leaders

OTHER CHAMBERS = active public opposition by either groups in the Chamber of Commerce or other community Chambers of Commerce

BLACK = active public opposition by Black leaders

UTILITIES = active public opposition by local utilities, such as rural electric cooperatives, city electric authorities

There were no contradictory configurations in the model. The configurations for rejection and acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter based on opposition actors are presented in Appendix A, Table A5.04.

Although the configurations of opposition to the proposed consolidation that can be linked to rejection are complex, there are some interesting trends. Active public opposition by local business (in combination with the presence AND absence of other actors) can be linked to rejection in six of the nine configurations. Farmers and/or farming associations are also active opponents in six of the configurations. Opposition by local utilities and a majority of the county commissioners are present in combination in three of the configurations.

The configurations of opposition to the proposed consolidation charter that can be linked to acceptance provide an important combination of actors/groups who do not vocally oppose the attempt. Factoring the two configurations can illuminate this. The factoring of acceptance is:

$$\text{ACCEPT} = \frac{\text{civic*farmers*city*county*business*other chambers*BLACK (homeowners*mayor*UTILITIES + HOMEOWNERS*MAYOR*utilities)}}{}$$

The absence of active public opposition by civic organizations AND farmers AND a majority of city council members AND a majority of county commissioners AND business leaders AND other groups in the local Chamber of Commerce or other Chambers AND the presence of active public opposition by local Black leaders with the absence of opposition by homeowners AND the mayor AND the presence of opposition by local utilities OR the presence of opposition by homeowners AND the mayor AND the absence of opposition by the local utilities can be linked to the acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter.

In order to explore which opponent actor's presence or absence is logically important for the consolidation outcome, the model was run with the "don't cares." These are presented in Table 5.05.

Table 5.05 Consolidation Opposition with “Don’t Cares”

reject	<u>black</u> + <u>FARMERS</u> + <u>COUNTY</u> + <u>BUSINESS</u> + <u>mayor*utilities</u> + <u>homeowners*utilities</u>
ACCEPT	— one of the following: — <u>farmers*business</u> + <u>business*BLACK</u> + <u>farmers*BLACK</u> + <u>civic*county*business</u>

PRESENCE in upper case; absence lower case; * = AND; + = OR

The presence of vocal, public opposition from three actors is logically sufficient for the rejection of the consolidation effort. Rejection of the proposed consolidation charter could be linked to vocal, public opposition by the farmers OR a majority of the county commission OR local business leaders. Since the farmers and county commissioners are probably indicative of the rural stakeholder sentiment, this could provide an indicator of rural disenchantment with the proposed rules. Two other combinations of actors can also be linked to rejection: the absence of opposition by the mayor AND the absence of opposition by utilities OR the absence of opposition by homeowners AND the absence of opposition by utilities. However, caution must be made in interpreting the absence of opposition from groups.

Acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter based on the actors is logically linked to one of four combination of actors: absence of opposition by the farmers AND absence of opposition by business leaders OR the presence of Black leaders opposition when combined with the absence of opposition by the farmers OR the absence of opposition by business leaders OR, finally the absence of opposition by civic organizations AND a majority of the county commission AND local business leaders. The combination of interest, here is the combination with active opposition. The proposed consolidation charter could be accepted over the objections of local Black leaders.

However, actors do not work in a vacuum. For each consolidation attempt there are both supporters and opposition debating the issue with a “war of words” (Riker 1986). The usefulness of the “don’t cares” allows the reduction of those actors to the most logical grouping to use together.

5.04 Boolean Analysis of Support and Opposition to the Proposed Consolidation Charter

Twelve actors, six who actively supported and six who actively opposed the consolidation effort were run together to explore the combination of both support and opposition to the consolidation charter at the same time. Since only twelve actors out of the original twenty supporting and opposing actors could be used, the set was taken from the “don’t care” list of actors.

The model used is:

$$\text{OUTCOME} = \text{DEVELOPERS} + \text{COUNTY} + \text{PROFESSIONALS} + \text{BLACK} + \text{BUSINESS} + \text{NAACP} + \text{FARMERS} + \text{MAYOR} + \text{COUNTY} + \text{BUSINESS} + \text{BLACK} + \text{UTILITIES}$$

where:

DEVELOPERS = active public support by the real estate, developers, and homebuilders individuals and groups

COUNTY = active public support by a majority of the county commissioners

PROFESSIONALS = active public support by professional organizations (bar association, trade unions, etc.)

BLACK = active public support by local Black Leaders

BUSINESS= active public support from business leaders

NAACP = public support by National Association for the Advancement of Colored People organization and/or local NAACP leaders

FARMERS = active public opposition by farmers or farming groups

MAYOR = active public opposition by the present city mayor

COUNTY = active public opposition by a majority of the present county commission

BUSINESS = active public opposition by local business leaders

BLACK = active public opposition by Black leaders

UTILITIES = active public opposition by local utilities, such as rural electric cooperatives, city electric authorities

The truth table is presented in Appendix A, Table A5.05. In order to delineate the supporters (who are the first six actors) from the opposition (who are the second six), the opposition was again presented in *italics* and underlined.

Note that there is support and the opposition by some groups on both sides. In many of the consolidation attempts a majority of the county commission opposed the effort. However, in three attempts, two rejections and one acceptance, a majority of the county commissioners supported the effort. In several cases the commission did not publicly support or oppose.

Again, the absence of public support by the NAACP organization or its leaders is the common term in the rejection of the proposed consolidation charters. Acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter does have several common terms in both support and opposition. Factoring will illuminate the common terms:

ACCEPT =
PROFESSIONALS*BLACK*BUSINESS*NAACP**civic*farmers*county*business*BLACK*
(developers*county*UTILITIES +DEVELOPERS*COUNTY*utilities)

The public support of professional leaders AND Black leaders AND business leaders AND the NAACP AND the absence of public opposition by civic organizations AND farmers AND a majority of the county commissioners AND business leaders AND even with the presence of public opposition by Black leaders AND the presence and absence of the other actors is important to the acceptance. Although both of the communities that accepted the consolidation charter had Black leader opposition, there was strong support from the Black community as well as the NAACP leaders. One interesting element is the absence of public opposition by a majority of the county commission in both communities. In one community the developers/homebuilders/ real estate interests supported the effort, but their activity is not known in the other case.

What combinations would logically lead to the outcome if all possible combinations were available? Including the “don’t cares” can provide a possible grouping. These are included in Table 5.06.

Table 5.06 Consolidation Supporters and Opposition with “Don’t Cares”

reject	naacp
ACCEPT	<p>— one of the following: —</p> <p>NAACP +</p> <p><i>farmers</i>*<i>business</i> +</p> <p><i>business</i>*BLACK +</p> <p><i>farmers</i>*BLACK +</p> <p>PROFESSIONALS*BLACK +</p> <p><i>civic</i>*<i>county</i>*<i>business</i> +</p> <p>PROFESSIONALS*<i>county</i>*<i>business</i> +</p> <p>PROFESSIONALS*<i>farmers</i>*<i>county</i> +</p> <p>PROFESSIONALS*<i>civic</i>*<i>business</i> +</p> <p>BLACK*<i>county</i>*<i>business</i> +</p> <p>BLACK*<i>civic</i>*<i>business</i> +</p> <p>BUSINESS*<i>civic</i>*<i>business</i> +</p> <p>PROFESSIONALS*BLACK*<i>county</i> +</p> <p>PROFESSIONALS*BLACK*<i>farmers</i> +</p> <p>PROFESSIONALS*BLACK*<i>civic</i> +</p> <p>BUSINESS*<i>county</i>*BLACK +</p> <p>BLACK*BUSINESS*BLACK</p>

PRESENCE in upper case; absence lower case; * = AND; + = OR

Among the actors who either support or oppose the consolidation attempt, the absence of public support by the NAACP leaders is a necessary and sufficient attribute for rejection of the proposed consolidation charter. The presence of support by the NAACP organization or a high official in the NAACP is also a sufficient attribute for acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter.

There are more logical acceptance combinations in the model. However, note that only one combination is needed for the outcome. Also, out of the six opposition actors the only active public opposition that logically could be linked to the acceptance of consolidation is presence of opposition by Black leaders.

However, what combination of actors, either in support or opposition, could lead to the outcome? The model was run again without NAACP to see what combinations occurred. These configurations mirror the formula in Table 5.07, excluding the attribute of support by the NAACP. The full model crisp set is presented in Appendix A, Table A 5.06. When these configurations were run with the “don’t cares” the ACCEPT formula was the same, but the

rejection formula did provide elements that were superfluous in conjunction with the attribute of presence or absence of support by the NAACP. This is presented in Table 5.07.

Table 5.07 “Don’t Cares” and Consolidation Supporters and Opposition without NAACP

reject	<u>black</u> + black + professionals + <u>FARMERS</u> + <u>COUNTY</u> + <u>BUSINESS</u>
ACCEPT	— one of the following: — <u>farmers</u> * <u>business</u> + <u>business</u> * <u>BLACK</u> + <u>farmers</u> * <u>BLACK</u> + PROFESSIONALS* <u>BLACK</u> + <u>civic</u> * <u>county</u> * <u>business</u> + PROFESSIONALS* <u>county</u> * <u>business</u> + PROFESSIONALS* <u>farmers</u> * <u>county</u> + PROFESSIONALS* <u>civic</u> * <u>business</u> + BLACK* <u>county</u> * <u>business</u> + BLACK* <u>civic</u> * <u>business</u> + BUSINESS* <u>civic</u> * <u>business</u> + PROFESSIONALS*BLACK* <u>county</u> + PROFESSIONALS*BLACK* <u>farmers</u> + PROFESSIONALS*BLACK* <u>civic</u> + BUSINESS* <u>county</u> * <u>BLACK</u> + BLACK*BUSINESS* <u>BLACK</u>

PRESENCE in upper case; absence lower case; * = AND; + = OR

There are six single attribute configurations that are logically important to the rejection of a proposed consolidation charter and each one is sufficient for the outcome. The first three are actors support or opposition absent from the campaign. The second three attributes are the presence of active public opposition to the proposed change: presence of opposition by farmers and farming organizations OR presence of active public opposition by a majority of the county commissioners OR active public opposition by local business leaders. All of these six are sufficient attributes that can be linked to rejection of the proposed consolidation charter.

However, it is the presence of public, vocal, active opposition by the farmer, county commissioners, or business leaders are important to rejection even when they are combined with supporters of the effort.

The acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter again requires only one configuration for a complete formula. In the choices there are several combinations with the active support by the professional organization OR Black leaders OR active opposition by Black leaders. In some combinations, the active support by professional organizations and the Black leaders are combined with the absence of other groups.

5.05 Boolean Analysis of Rules and Actors

This section will put the rules and actors together. When the electorate votes on a proposed charter (in this case a proposed consolidation charter) they must vote on the complete package of rules. When groups actively and publicly support or oppose the proposed consolidation charter, it is assumed that public support and opposition is based on the whole charter. The set of rules in the proposed charter must be taken in total. There could be rules in the charter that are not to the group's liking, but these rules, it is assumed, are not disagreeable enough to make the group/individual not support the total package. In this section, actors who support or oppose the consolidation effort will be linked to the package of the consolidation charter rules. In this case only actors who were noted as either publicly supporting, PRESENCE of SUPPORT, or publicly opposing, PRESENCE of OPPOSITION, will be discussed.

The model for active, public support is:

SUPPORT =
DISTRICTS + NUMBER + SEATS + INITIATIVE + REFERENDUM + RECALL + TAX
RATES + DEBT LIMITS + FOG + MAYOR + VETO

The model for active public opposition is like the support model, but opposition actors are again in *italics* and underlined to differentiate them from the supporters:

OPPOSITION =
DISTRICTS + NUMBER + SEATS + INITIATIVE + REFERENDUM + RECALL + TAX
RATES + DEBT LIMITS + FOG + MAYOR + VETO

Each actor was run against the proposed rules. These eleven rules that include the Steven Maser's procedural safeguards in the proposed charter, where:

- DISTRICT = presence of the procedural safeguard in the number of district representatives
- NUMBER = presence of the procedural safeguard in number of districts
- SEATS = presence of the procedural safeguard in number of seats
- INITIATIVE = presence of the procedural safeguard in initiative
- REFERENDUM = presence of the procedural safeguard in referendum petition
- RECALL = presence of the procedural safeguard in recall
- TAX RATES = presence of the procedural safeguard for tax limits
- DEBT LIMITS = presence of the procedural safeguard for debt limits
- FOG = presence of the procedural safeguard in form of government (presence is mayor/council)
- MAYOR = presence of the procedural safeguard in direct election of Mayor
- VETO = presence of the procedural safeguard in mayor veto

Homeowners/taxpayers. The first group will be the homeowners and taxpayers, since they voiced fear of the cost of the proposed government. Homeowner/taxpayer groups were found to publicly support the proposed consolidation charter in five of the twelve attempts. There were no contradictions in the mix of proposed rules. The formula for active support is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{SUPPORT HOMEOWNERS/TAXPAYERS} = \\
 & [1] \text{DISTRICT} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{RECALL} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \text{debt_limit} * \\
 & \quad \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO} + \\
 & [2] \text{district} * \text{number} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{RECALL} * \text{tax_rate} * \text{debt_limit} * \\
 & \quad \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO} + \\
 & [3] \text{DISTRICT} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{seats} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{recall} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \\
 & \quad \text{debt_limit} * \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO} + \\
 & [4] \text{district} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{seats} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{RECALL} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \text{DEBT_LIMIT} * \\
 & \quad \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO}
 \end{aligned}$$

There are some common rules in the proposed consolidation charter. The initiative, referendum, mayor-council form of government, direct election of mayor, and mayor veto rules are present in all of the four configurations. However, this is just the presence of active support by the homeowners/taxpayers in the observed data. When the presence of support is run with the “don’t cares” the formula for the logical combinations of rules that can be linked to public support by the homeowners/taxpayers association is:

$$\text{SUPPORT HOMEOWNERS/TAXPAYERS} = [1] \text{ SEATS} + [2] \text{ DISTRICT* TAX_RATES}$$

This provided two interesting combinations. First, that the provision of the same or an increase in the number of seats in the proposed consolidation charter is a sufficient attribute for support OR second that the provision of the same or an increase in the number of districts AND the procedural safeguard of a tax rate cap can be logically linked to support by the homeowners/taxpayers associations. The configuration with the presence of procedural safeguards for tax rates may be intuitively obvious, but is important to have agreement. What is interesting is that procedural safeguards in electoral system rules are logically important to their support.

The opposition actors are again in italics and underlined to differentiate them from supporters. The model did not have any contradictions. The model active public opposition is:

$$\begin{aligned} & \underline{\text{OPPOSITION HOMEOWNERS/TAXPAYERS}} = \\ & [1] \text{ district*number*seats*initiative*REFERENDUM*recall*TAX_RATES*} \\ & \quad \text{debt_limit*fog* mayor*veto} + \\ & [2] \text{ DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats* initiative*referendum*recall*tax_rates*} \\ & \quad \text{DEBT_LIMITS*fog*MAYOR*VETO} \end{aligned}$$

This formula for active, public opposition represents two cases among the twelve attempts. The common attributes among these two cases is the absence of the safeguard for the same number of representative seats and the absence of the safeguard for the form of government, in other words the change to a council manager form of government. This is an interesting mix of observed cases since in the first configuration there is a procedural safeguard for tax rates and in the second case there is the presence of a procedural safeguard for debt limits. When the presence of opposition by homeowners and taxpayer groups is run with the “don’t cares” the absence of opposition, the formula for the logical combinations of rules that can be linked to public opposition by the homeowners/taxpayers association is:

$$\underline{\text{OPPOSITION HOMEOWNERS/TAXPAYERS}} = \text{fog}$$

The necessary and sufficient attribute for active opposition is the absence of the procedural safeguard for the provision of the mayor council form of government, in other words the change to a council-manager form. Home owners and taxpayer may desire responsiveness

over efficiency. The provision of a mayor-council form of government may provide greater accountability to the local property owners.

Black leaders. Black leaders in the communities have publicly supported and publicly opposed the consolidation charter. What mix of rules can be observed and logically discerned that can be linked to either support or opposition? The Black leaders were run with the combination of rules. Black leaders’ public support for the proposed consolidation charter occurred in half of the twelve cases. These six combinations reduce to four configurations. The formula for support is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{SUPPORT BLACK} = \\
 & [1] \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*initiative*referendum*recall*tax_rates*} \\
 & \quad \text{DEBT_LIMITS* MAYOR*VETO} + \\
 & [2] \text{DISTRICT*SEATS*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*TAX_RATES*} \\
 & \quad \text{debt_limits*FOG* MAYOR*VETO} + \\
 & [3] \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats* INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\
 & \quad \text{tax_rates* debt_limits* FOG* MAYOR*VETO} + \\
 & [4] \text{district*NUMBER*seats* INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\
 & \quad \text{TAX_RATES* DEBT_LIMITS*FOG* MAYOR*VETO}
 \end{aligned}$$

There were no contradictions in the set. The only attribute common to the four configurations is the presence of direct election of mayor, in combination with other attributes. However, in all the combinations there is at least one of the electoral system procedural safeguards present. The fourth configuration has only one of the electoral system rules present, the presence of the maintenance or increase in the number of districts, but the configuration does have the presence of direct democracy rules (initiative, referendum, recall, tax rates, and debt limits) and the presence of allocating authority procedural safeguards (form of government, direct election of mayor, and mayor veto).

When these rule configuration were run with the absence of support and the “don’t cares” the logical formula is:

$$\text{SUPPORT BLACK} = [1] \text{DEBT_LIMITS} + [2] \text{DISTRICT*RECALL}$$

The provision of debt limits could be a sufficient rule linked to support by the Black leaders. The maintenance or increase in the number of district representatives AND the provision of recall could also be linked logically to the support by local Black leaders. This logical formula

is interesting since the usual assumption is that Black leaders are only interested in representation. In this formula a sufficient attribute for support is the presence of debt limits. Black leaders may desire assurance that costs are controlled.

In the second configuration the combination of an electoral system procedural safeguard and a direct democracy safeguard, again, provide important insight. The increase in the number of district representatives is expected. When combined with the ability to recall elected officials who have deviated from their preferences can be linked to support. This would provide the Black community a source of recourse if elected officials deviate from the median voter.

Local Black leaders have also publicly opposed the consolidation charter. In some cases, when local Black leaders have supported the proposed charter there have been other local Black leaders who have opposed the charter. For example, in the 1967 Jacksonville-Duval County and 1990 Athens-Clarke County successful consolidation attempts, some Black leaders supported and some leaders opposed the consolidation charter. In the twelve attempts, Black leaders publicly opposed the proposed change in four attempts. There were no contradictions in the mix of proposed rules and Black leaders opposition. The formula for the mix of rules and Black leader opposition is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{OPPOSITION BLACK} = \\
 & [1] \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*initiative*referendum*recall*tax_rates*} \\
 & \quad \text{DEBT_LIMITS*fog* MAYOR*VETO} + \\
 & [2] \text{district* NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*tax_rates*} \\
 & \quad \text{debt_limits* FOG* MAYOR*veto} + \\
 & [3] \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\
 & \quad \text{tax_rates* debt_limits* FOG* MAYOR* VETO} + \\
 & [4] \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*SEATS* INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\
 & \quad \text{TAX_RATES* debt_limits* FOG* MAYOR* VETO}
 \end{aligned}$$

The configurations of rules in active opposition by Black leaders have one attribute in common, the presence of the maintenance or increase in the number of districts. In configuration [4], all the electoral system procedural safeguards are present. The logical configurations that include the presence of opposition and the “don’t cares” provides some insight as to why there is active opposition:

OPPOSITION BLACK =

NUMBER*RECALL*debt_limits +

-- One of the Following --

[1] tax_rates*fog* +

[2] referendum*fog +

[3] NUMBER*fog +

[4] DEBT_LIMITS*fog +

[5] fog* MAYOR +

[6] fog* VETO +

The first term of the formula has the presence of the maintenance or increase in the number of districts AND the provision of recall AND the absence of the provision of debt limits OR one from the second group of terms which all have a logically equal importance of occurrence. For example, the logical combination of the absence of tax rate procedural safeguards AND the absence of the mayor council form of government, could lead to the active public opposition by Black leaders. Each of the configurations in this group has the absence of the mayor-council form of government. This could be important to Black leaders as an allocating authority safeguard.

It is interesting that there is active opposition when electoral system safeguards are present in the configuration. For example, the presence of increased number of districts and recall and absence of debt limits. When this is compared with the active support it appears almost contradictory. There is a common term, the presence of recall. However, in the opposition formula the electoral system is the number of districts not an increase in the number of representatives. Black leaders could oppose rules that increased the number of districts but not representation. Also, there is the absence of debt limits. Active support by Black leaders was linked to the presence of debt limits, so it is consistent to see active opposition when debt limits are not included in the proposed consolidation charter.

Business leaders. Local business leaders were another group who actively supported and opposed the proposed consolidation charter. The model for business leaders' support based on the proposed rules did not have any contradictions. In the twelve attempts, there was a

presence of business leaders' support in nine attempts. The formula for the nine cases reduces to seven configurations:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{SUPPORT BUSINESS} = \\
 & [1] \text{DISTRICT} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{seats} * \text{initiative} * \text{referendum} * \text{recall} * \text{tax_rates} * \\
 & \quad \text{DEBT_LIMITS} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO} + \\
 & [2] \text{DISTRICT} * \text{SEATS} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{RECALL} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \\
 & \quad \text{debt_limits} * \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO} + \\
 & [3] \text{DISTRICT} * \text{number} * \text{seats} * \text{initiative} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{recall} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \\
 & \quad \text{debt_limits} * \text{fog} * \text{mayor} * \text{veto} + \\
 & [4] \text{district} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{seats} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{RECALL} * \text{tax_rates} * \\
 & \quad \text{debt_limits} * \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{veto} + \\
 & [5] \text{district} * \text{number} * \text{SEATS} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{RECALL} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \\
 & \quad \text{debt_limits} * \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO} + \\
 & [6] \text{district} * \text{number} * \text{seats} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{RECALL} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \\
 & \quad \text{debt_limits} * \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO} + \\
 & [7] \text{DISTRICT} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{seats} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{recall} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \\
 & \quad \text{debt_limits} * \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO}
 \end{aligned}$$

There are no common attributes to the entire formula. However, reduction to the logical attributes provides a more parsimonious formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{SUPPORT BUSINESS} = \\
 & \quad \text{DISTRICT} * \text{recall} + \\
 & \quad \text{district} * \text{RECALL} * \text{debt_limits} + \\
 & \quad \text{-- One of the Following --} \\
 & \quad \quad \text{SEATS} + \\
 & \quad \quad \text{TAX_RATES} * \text{debt_limits}
 \end{aligned}$$

The presence of same number or increase in district representatives AND the absence of recall OR the absence of increase of district representatives AND the presence of recall AND the absence of debt limits OR either an increase in the number of seats OR presence of tax rate cap AND the absence of debt limits. The last two configurations have a logically equal importance so only one is needed to complete the formula. The choice of the presence of an increase in the number of seats is sufficient for support. Perhaps an increase in seats could provide greater access to business leaders.

This formula is important logically to the support of business leaders. In the last configuration, the presence of tax rate limits, even when debt limits are not included, are

important to active support by business leaders. This provides the financial safeguards that business community could desire. There is also the presence of electoral system safeguards and in one configuration the presence of a direct democracy rule. Business leaders may desire the assurance that tax rates would be controlled, but may view debt limits as a means to increase the economy of the are.

Opposition by business leaders occurred in seven of the twelve cases. There were no contradictions in the model. The formula for the presence of business leaders' opposition is:

OPPOSITION BUSINESS =

- [1] DISTRICT*number*seats* initiative*REFERENDUM*recall*TAX_RATES *
debt_limits* fog*mayor*veto +
- [2]district*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*tax_rates*
debt_limits* FOG* MAYOR*veto +
- [3]DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*initiative*referendum*recall*tax_rates*
DEBT_LIMITS* MAYOR*VETO +
- [4] district*number*SEATS*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL* tax_rates*
debt_limits *FOG* MAYOR*VETO +
- [5]DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*tax_rates*
debt_limits* FOG* MAYOR*VETO +
- [6]DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*recall*TAX_RATES*
debt_limits*FOG* MAYOR* VETO +
- [7]district*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*TAX_RATES*
DEBT_LIMITS*FOG* MAYOR* VETO

Just like the support formula this seems complex, but reduction with the “don’t cares” provides:

OPPOSITION BUSINESS =

- [1] RECALL*tax_rates +
- [2] DEBT_LIMITS*FOG +
- [3] NUMBER*seats* TAX_RATES +
- [4] DISTRICT*seats* FOG +
- One of the Following ---
- DISTRICT*seats* debt_limits +
- DISTRICT*seats* REFERENDUM

Business leaders' opposition to the proposed consolidation charter could logically be linked to one of five configurations: the presence of a recall procedural safeguard AND the absence of a tax rate cap procedural safeguard OR the presence of a debt limit procedural

safeguards AND the presence of the mayor-council form of government OR the presence of the number of districts procedural safeguard AND the absence of the same or increase in the number of seats AND the presence of tax rates cap procedural safeguard OR the presence in the same or increase in the number of districts AND the absence of the same or increase in the number of seats AND the presence of the mayor-council form of government OR, one of the following, either the presence in the same or increase in the number of districts AND the absence of the same or increase in the number of seats AND the absence of debt limits OR presence in the same or increase in the number of districts AND the absence of the same or increase in the number of seats AND the presence of the procedural safeguard of referendum. Remember that the last two configurations have the same logical importance of occurrence so only one is needed for a complete formula.

This formula may appear contradictory to the support by business leaders, but the logic still holds. In configuration # 3, the tax rate cap safeguard is present. The presence of this attribute was linked to support in the model before. However, in this formula the tax rate cap is combined with an increase in the number of districts and the decrease in the number of seats whereas in the support model the tax rate cap was linked to the lack of debt limits. In the support model debt limits were absent but in the opposition model they are present. The business leaders could desire greater spending if it provided increased growth. In the business opposition model there are two configurations with the mayor-council form of government (FOG). Business leader may desire the efficiency of a manager form of government.

NAACP. Several groups had either active support or active opposition. One group had only presence or absence of active support was the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). As noted earlier their organization and/or leaders were active supporters in the successful attempts. The mix of rules for their support is interesting:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SUPPORT NAACP} = & \\ & \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*initiative*referendum*recall*tax_rates*} \\ & \text{DEBT_LIMIT*fog* MAYOR *VETO} + \\ & \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*SEATS*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\ & \text{TAX_RATES* debt_limit*FOG* MAYOR *VETO} \end{aligned}$$

This combination is familiar since it is the configuration for the acceptance of the charter in the first section. Note that the common rules for both configurations are: the same or increase in the number of district representatives AND the same or increase in number of districts AND the direct election of mayor AND the provision of the mayoral veto.

The logical support model is also the logical outcome with the “don’t cares”:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{SUPPORT NAACP} = \\
 & \text{--- one of the following ---} \\
 & \quad \text{tax_rates*fog +} \\
 & \quad \text{referendum*fog +} \\
 & \quad \text{NUMBER*fog +} \\
 & \quad \text{DEBT_LIMITS*fog +} \\
 & \quad \text{fog*MAYOR +} \\
 & \quad \text{fog*VETO +} \\
 & \text{--- one of the following ---} \\
 & \quad \text{NUMBER*SEATS +} \\
 & \quad \text{NUMBER*RECALL*TAX_RATES*debt_limits +} \\
 & \quad \text{DISTRICT* NUMBER*RECALL*TAX_RATES}
 \end{aligned}$$

There are two groups of logical combinations in which each configuration has the same logical importance of occurrence, therefore only one from each group is needed to provide a complete formula. In the first group the absence of the mayor-council form of government, which is the presence of council manager form of government, is common. This is interesting since it would be assumed that the NAACP organization or leaders would have a preference for the responsiveness of the mayor-council form of government, but this was Athens, Georgia which had a long tradition of strong mayor. Perhaps the desire for an alternative was present. It should be remembered that the form of government is in conjunction with other attributes such as the presence in the same or an increase in the number of districts, the third configuration. The second group is more conventional since the configurations have the presence of electoral system safeguards.

Farmers. Farmers and farming groups were important in the opposition model of actors. The combination of rules that can be linked to farmers’ support or opposition should be

interesting. There were only two cases out of the twelve where reference to support by farmers was present. The model of the combination of proposed rules in those attempts are:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{SUPPORT FARMERS} = \\ & [1] \text{DISTRICT} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{seats} * \text{initiative} * \text{referendum} * \text{recall} * \text{tax_rates} * \\ & \quad \text{DEBT_LIMITS} * \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO} + \\ & [2] \text{district} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{seats} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{RECALL} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \\ & \quad \text{DEBT_LIMITS} * \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{VETO} \end{aligned}$$

There are some common attributes in these proposed consolidation rules. First the presence of the maintenance or increase in the number of districts AND debt limits AND mayor-council form of government AND direct election of mayor AND mayor veto AND the absence of the maintenance or increase in the number of seats. The allocating authority rules that signal leadership of the mayor are all present. The support for the number of districts in the electoral system could be important since it would assure representation of rural areas and farmers' interests. The inclusion of debt limits could be important for a group that is tied to the land. The presence of tax rate caps in one case and the absence of that rule in the other case is interesting since farm land could be burdened with tax payments.

When the observed cases are run with the "don't cares" and the absence of support the combination of rules that could be logically linked to the support of farmers is:

$$\text{SUPPORT FARMERS} = \text{DEBT_LIMITS} * \text{FOG}$$

Support by farmers logically could occur when there is the presence of the direct democracy rule for debt limits AND the presence of mayor-council form of government. The mayor-council form of government, perhaps, could provide greater responsiveness to farmers and signal leadership in the community. Debt limits could keep the cost of government down.

However, farmers and farming groups publicly opposed the proposed consolidation charters in six of the twelve attempts. The observed combinations of rules for these six attempts that can be linked to farmers' opposition are:

$$\begin{aligned} & \underline{\text{OPPOSITION FARMERS}} = \\ & [1] \text{DISTRICT} * \text{number} * \text{seats} * \text{initiative} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{recall} * \text{TAX_RATES} * \\ & \quad \text{debt_limits} * \text{fog} * \text{mayor} * \text{veto} + \\ & [2] \text{district} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{seats} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{RECALL} * \text{tax_rates} * \\ & \quad \text{debt_limits} * \text{FOG} * \text{MAYOR} * \text{veto} + \\ & [3] \text{district} * \text{NUMBER} * \text{seats} * \text{INITIATIVE} * \text{REFERENDUM} * \text{recall} * \text{tax_rates} * \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{debt_limits*FOG* MAYOR*VETO} + \\
[4] & \text{district*number*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\
& \text{TAX_RATES* debt_limits *FOG* MAYOR*VETO} + \\
[5] & \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\
& \text{tax_rates* debt_limits*FOG* MAYOR* VETO} + \\
[6] & \text{DISTRICT*number*SEATS*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\
& \text{TAX_RATES*debt_limits *FOG* MAYOR*VETO}
\end{aligned}$$

There is one common attribute in all six of the observed combinations: the presence of the procedural safeguard of referendum. When the model was run with the “don’t cares” the formula was:

OPPOSITION FARMERS =

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{number*TAX_RATES} + \\
& \text{--- One of the Following ---} \\
& \text{seats* tax_rates*debt_limits} + \\
& \text{NUMBER *tax_rates*debt_limits} + \\
& \text{seats * INITIATIVE*tax_rates} + \\
& \text{seats * REFERENDUM*tax_rates} + \\
& \text{NUMBER*INITIATIVE*tax_rates} + \\
& \text{NUMBER*REFERENDUM*tax_rates}
\end{aligned}$$

Although there are seven possible configurations, the last six have a logically equal importance of occurrence so only one is needed to complete the formula. So, logically public opposition to the proposed consolidation charter could occur if there was not the electoral system procedural safeguard for the number of districts AND the presence of a procedural safeguard for tax rate cap OR for example, if there was not the electoral system procedural safeguard for the number of seats AND the absence of a procedural safeguard for tax rate cap AND the absence of a procedural safeguard of debt limits. The absence of tax rate cap is in every combination in the second choice group of configurations, but it is paired with either the presence or absence of another direct democracy rule AND another electoral rule.

Farmers fear the cost of government. Active opposition could occur when there is not a procedural safeguard for the financial rules, as in the last six configurations. However, in the first configuration the presence of a tax rate cap and the decrease in the number of districts can be

linked to active opposition. Perhaps the farmers, who live in the rural area, fear the decrease in their representation as much as their finances.

County Commissioners. Active support by a majority of the county commissioners occurred only three times out of the twelve attempts. However these three combinations of rules for the proposed consolidation charter reduce to only two configurations, where:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{SUPPORT COUNTY COMMISSION} = \\ & [1] \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*initiative*referendum*recall*tax_rates*} \\ & \quad \text{DEBT_LIMITS*MAYOR*VETO} + \\ & [2] \text{district*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\ & \quad \text{TAX_RATES*DEBT_LIMITS*FOG* MAYOR* VETO} \end{aligned}$$

Note that this formula is close to the formula for support by the farmers. Common elements are the presence of five attributes: the maintenance or increase in the number of districts AND debt limits AND direct election of mayor AND mayor veto AND the absence of the maintenance of increase in the number of seats. The support for the number of districts in the electoral system could be important since it allowed them the ability to be elected. The inclusion of debt limits could be important for a group that feels the interests of the unincorporated areas.

When this model was run with the “don’t cares” the logical formula was:

$$\text{SUPPORT COUNTY COMMISSION} = \text{DEBT_LIMITS}$$

The provision of debt limits in the proposed charter is the necessary and sufficient attribute that could be linked to support.

However, a majority of county commissioners actively opposed the proposed consolidation charter six times out of the twelve attempts. There were six differing configurations for opposition:

$$\begin{aligned} & \underline{\text{OPPOSITION COUNTY COMMISSION}} = \\ & [1] \text{district*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*tax_rates*} \\ & \quad \text{debt_limits* FOG* MAYOR*veto} + \\ & [2] \text{district*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*recall*tax_rates*} \\ & \quad \text{debt_limits*FOG* MAYOR*VETO} + \\ & [3] \text{district*number*SEATS*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL* tax_rates*} \\ & \quad \text{debt_limits *FOG* MAYOR*VETO} + \\ & [4] \text{DISTRICT*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*recall*TAX_RATES*} \\ & \quad \text{debt_limits*FOG* MAYOR* VETO} + \end{aligned}$$

[5] DISTRICT*number*SEATS*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*
TAX_RATES*debt_limits *FOG* MAYOR*VETO +
[6] district*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*TAX_RATES*
DEBT_LIMITS*FOG* MAYOR* VETO

The common elements in the six observed cases of proposed rules are the presence of four attributes: initiative procedural safeguard AND referendum procedural safeguard AND mayor-council form of government procedural safeguard AND the direct election of the mayor procedural safeguard. These direct democracy rules and the allocating authority rules could be linked to the active opposition by a majority of the county commission.

When this model was run with the “don’t cares,” the formula was more complex for opposition than the support model.

OPPOSITION COUNTY COMMISSION =

district*NUMBER +
district*SEATS +

---One of the Following ---
INITIATIVE*recall +
NUMBER*recall*debt_limits +
recall*debt_limits*FOG +
recall*debt_limits*MAYOR +
recall*debt_limits*VETO +
NUMBER*REFERENDUM*recall +
NUMBER*seats*TAX_RATES +
REFERENDUM*recall*FOG +
REFERENDUM*recall*MAYOR +
REFERENDUM*recall*VETO

Active opposition by a majority of the county commissioners could occur logically if there was the absence of the same or an increase in the number of district representatives AND the presence of the same or increase in the number of districts OR absence of the same or an increase in the number of district representatives AND the presence of the same or increase in the number of seats OR one of the group of combinations, for example, the presence of the procedural safeguard for initiative AND the absence of the procedural safeguard for recall.

Again, remember that only one configuration is selected from the group of ten possible configurations since they all have logically equal importance. The first two logical configurations have the absence of the same or increase in district representatives, in the presence of either the same or increase in the number of districts OR the same or increase in the number of seats. The choice between the ten groups of configurations has the absence of the procedural safeguard for recall in conjunction with other attributes, except for the seventh configuration that has the presence of the same or increase in the number of districts OR presence of the procedural safeguard for referendum OR presence of the procedural safeguard for tax rates.

Utilities/rural electric cooperative. The final group is the utilities. This group contains not only city electric authorities or water and sewer authority, but also rural electric cooperatives. This group was in active, public opposition only. They opposed the proposed consolidation charter four times in the twelve attempts. However, the formula reduces to three combinations of observed configurations:

$$\underline{OPPOSITION UTILITIES} =$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{DISTRICT*SEATS*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\ & \text{TAX_RATES*debt_limit*FOG* MAYOR *VETO} \\ & \text{district*NUMBER*seats*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\ & \text{tax_rates*debt_limits* FOG* MAYOR*veto +} \\ & \text{district*number*SEATS*INITIATIVE*REFERENDUM*RECALL*} \\ & \text{tax_rates*debt_limits *FOG* MAYOR*VETO} \end{aligned}$$

There are six common attributes in the proposed sets of rules: the presence of the procedural safeguard for initiative AND the presence of the procedural safeguard for referendum AND the presence of the procedural safeguard for recall AND the presence of the mayor-council form of government AND direct election of mayor AND the absence of procedural safeguard for tax rates, in conjunction with the other attributes. When the model was run with the “don’t cares” the logical formula became:

$$\underline{OPPOSITION UTILITIES} = \text{SEATS} + \text{district*RECALL*tax_rates}$$

The presence of the procedural safeguard for the number of seats is a sufficient attribute OR the absence of the procedural safeguard for district representation AND the presence of the

procedural safeguard for recall AND the absence of procedural safeguard for tax rates. The absence of a tax rate safeguard is expected, since the utilities could either be taxing units or could be taxed. The utilities actively opposed the charter when the number of seats increased, probably since that would increase the number of officials that would be required for a decision.

Finally, the context of the community in which consolidation is attempted can provide information as to the circumstances of the attempt. This is analyzed in the next section.

5.06 Community Context of Consolidation

The last section looks at the context of the community and the outcome. The variables used are those that could affect the local community. The model used is:

$$\text{ACCEPT} = \\ \text{DECREASE_POP} + \text{HOUSING} + \text{TAX_RATE} + \text{GOVT_EMP} + \text{BLACK_OFFICIALS} \\ + \text{DISSIMILARITY} + \text{BLACK_POP} + \text{BLACK_PA}$$

Where: DECREASE_POP = population has decreased over the last year
HOUSING = increased percent of general expenditures on housing and community development
TAX_RATE = presence of the tax levy change rate is greater than the assessment change rate, where levy and assessment are in year 2000 dollars
GOVT_EMP = government employees are increasing at a faster rate than the general population
BLACK_OFFICIALS = presence of the percentage of black elected officials greater than the percentage of Blacks in city
DISSIMILARITY = A dissimilarity index of the black population to the non-black population greater than 60, very high dissimilarity
BLACK_POP = presence of Black population of over 25% of total population
BLACK_PA = the percent of the Black population who lists their occupation as public administration is greater than or equal to the percent of Black citizens in the general population

The crisp set Truth Table is presented in Appendix A, Table 5.07. One interesting thing about this full model Truth Table is that the housing expenditures and dissimilarity are common in the acceptance of the proposed consolidation charter. When these were reduced using the “don’t cares” the formula for rejection and acceptance is presented in Table 5.08.

Table 5.08 Community Context and Consolidation

reject	[1] housing + [2] pop_decrease*black_officials + [3] GOVT_EMP* black_officials + [4] black_officials*BLACK_POP +
ACCEPT	-- one of the following -- [1] BLACK_OFFICIALS + [2] pop_decrease*HOUSING* BLACK_POP + [3] pop_decrease*HOUSING* BLACK_PA + [4] pop_decrease*GOVT_EMP*BLACK_PA + -- one of the following -- [5] POP_DECREASE*govt_emp + [6] HOUSING* govt_emp* + [7] tax_rate*govt_emp* black_pa + [8] tax_rate*govt_emp* black_pop + [9] POP_DECREASE*HOUSING*black_pa [10] POP_DECREASE*HOUSING*black_pop

PRESENCE in upper case; absence lower case; * = AND; + = OR

The first noticeable aspect is that the rejection model lacks the tax levy to assessment ratio and Black public administration attributes have reduced out of the model. The rejection model has the absence of increased expenditures on housing and community development in reject #1. This becomes a sufficient attribute for rejection. Perhaps these communities do not have a crisis in their economy. In reject #2, the population is growing, but the percentage of Black elected officials is not high. In this community, again, there may not a crisis, although the Black community is not represented. The Black community may desire representation but since their population is not above the twenty-five percent level, they may not have their preferences accepted. This is also the case in reject #4, low numbers of Black elected officials and the Black population above the critical level could be locked out of the system.

The high percent of government employees to general population, in reject #3, and the absence of the percent of Black officials that mirrors the general population, could point to the desire for change that is not salient to the public. The growth of government employees could oppose consolidation for fear of job loss and could garner support for rejection.

The rejection model lacks any variable that could trigger stress or crisis other than growing government. This does not mean that in some case there might not be stress, but that with this set of attributes the attributes were not logical to the outcome.

However, the acceptance model provides a different picture. Only two configurations are required for a complete formula and the configurations in each set have the same logical importance. In each set of configurations there are some indications of stress, but the tax levy ratio is not one of them.

The high percent of Black elected officials is a sufficient attribute for acceptance. This agrees with the direct attribute analysis. In choice ACCEPT # 2, # 3, and # 4, the population is increasing, and housing expenditures are increasing, and either Black population above the critical level or increased Black public administrators. This underscores the importance of a minority group in the decision to consolidate the city and county.

Population decrease is present in choice ACCEPT # 5, # 9, and #10. In # 9 and # 10; there is an increase in the expenditures on housing and community development even though the percent of Black population is low OR the percent of Black public administrators is low.

5.07 Conclusion

This analysis underscores the importance of rules proposed for consolidation. The electorate could find the proposed effort acceptable if the mix of rules provides them with procedural safeguards to protect their interests. The absence of procedural safeguards in electoral system rules is the most important attribute associated with rejection. Acceptance is more complex. However, there is evidence that the presence of procedural safeguards in electoral systems in the proposed consolidation charter can be linked to the outcome. However, there is evidence that fiscal restraints are also important, as well as direct democracy rules.

The implication of different actors' support or opposition for different combinations of rules in proposed consolidation constitutions is noteworthy. The analysis presents empirical evidence to support the assumption that taxpayers and homeowners will support financial rules that safeguard their interests. However, this safeguard is combined with representation rules in the electoral system domain. Citizens may support rules that increase in the number of seats since this also safeguards their representation. On the other hand, homeowners and taxpayers

may actively oppose a consolidation charter that contains the council-manager form of government, since this form is seen as emphasizing efficiency to the detriment of responsiveness.

The local Black leaders may support a combination of rules that provides representation safeguards, but this is combined with the ability to recall an elected official who is not responsive to their interests. The Boolean analysis also reveals that Black leaders could also support a combination of rules that included a safeguard of debt limits since this would alleviate the costs of government on the Black community. Even when a charter included both an electoral system safeguard that increases the number of districts and a direct democracy safeguard in the recall, Black leaders could actively oppose consolidation rules that did not provide the debt limit safeguard. In this case the lack of the debt limit safeguard may be more important to the economic health of the Black community.

Business leaders are always assumed to support efficiency and economic viability. This is evident in the support of a tax rate cap procedural safeguard even when a debt limit safeguard is not provided. The debt limit may not be as important as tax limits to this group based on projected effects on the local economy. Business interests, also, would support rules that provided recall safeguard, even when combined with rules that decreased the number of districts and did not provide a safeguard on debt limit. However, they could also support a combination of rules that did not provide the recall safeguard if the set included an increase in the number of districts. This could increase their representation.

Business leaders could actively oppose proposed consolidation rules, if the rules did not provide a tax rate safeguard, even if the combination included the safeguard in recall. The presence of a tax rate safeguard may not be enough to overcome active opposition if the combination does not include an increase in the number of seats on the council, even if there is a safeguard in the number of districts.

Rural interests actively support a combination of charter rules that provided for the mayor council form of government and debt limits. The desire for leadership and assurance of financial safeguards are important to these actors. However, they could actively oppose a combination of rules if the financial safeguard in a tax rate cap was provided, but increased district representation was not. They could also actively oppose a combination of rules that

provides the representation safeguard but not the financial safeguard. This group would support rules that provide both.

Minority group support was found to be pivotal to the success of consolidation efforts. Support or opposition by minorities depended on the mix of rules. This could depend on the mix of rules. This mix of rules in local constitutions will be explored in Chapter 6, a case study of charter changes.